1、Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy TransitionAGlobal Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy TransitionDaniel Raimi,Yuqi Zhu,Richard G.Newell,Brian C.Prest,and Aaron BergmanReport 23-02 March 2023Resources for the FutureiAbout the AuthorsDaniel Raimi is a fellow at Re

2、sources for the Future(RFF)and a lecturer at the Gerald R.Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan.He works on a range of energy policy issues with a focus on tools to enable an equitable energy transition.He has published in academic journals including Science,Science Advances,Env

3、ironmental Science and Technology,Journal of Economic Perspectives,Review of Environmental Economics and Policy,Energy Research and Social Science,and Energy Policy and in popular outlets including The New Republic,Newsweek,Slate,and Fortune.He has presented his research for policymakers,industry,an

4、d other stakeholders around the United States and internationally,including before the Energy and Mineral Resources Subcommittee of the US Houses Natural Resources Committee.In 2017,he published The Fracking Debate(Columbia University Press),a book that combines stories from his travels to dozens of

5、 oil-and gas-producing regions with a detailed examination of key policy issues.Yuqi Zhu joined RFF as a senior research associate in 2022 after receiving his masters degree in public policy from the Harvard Kennedy School.Prior to graduate school,he worked in corporate development at Liberty Media,

6、a media and communications holding company in Denver.Dr.Richard G.Newell is the president and CEO of RFF,an independent,nonprofit research institution that improves environmental,energy,and natural resource decisions through impartial economic research and policy engagement.From 2009 to 2011,he serv

7、ed as the administrator of the US Energy Information Administration(EIA),the agency responsible for official US government energy statistics and analysis.Dr.Newell is an adjunct professor at Duke University,where he was previously the Gendell Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics and found

8、ing director of its Energy Initiative and Energy Data Analytics Lab.He has also served as the senior economist for energy and environment on the Presidents Council of Economic Advisers and was a senior fellow,and later a board member,at RFF.Brian C.Prest is an economist and fellow at RFF specializin

9、g in the economics of climate change,energy economics,and oil and gas supply.Prest uses economic theory and econometrics to improve energy and environmental policies by assessing their impacts on society.His recent work includes improving the scientific basis of the social cost of carbon and economi

10、c modeling of various policies around oil and gas supply.His research has been published in peer-reviewed journals such as Nature,the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,the Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists,and the Journal of Environmental Economics and Managemen

11、t.His work has also been featured in popular press outlets including the Washington Post,the Wall Street Journal,the New York Times,Reuters,the Associated Press,and Barrons.Aaron Bergman is a fellow at RFF.Prior to joining RFF,he was the lead for macroeconomics and emissions at the EIA,managing EIAs

12、 modeling in those areas.Before working at EIA,Bergman spent over a decade in the policy office at the Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy TransitioniiDepartment of Energy,working on a broad array of climate and environmental policies.Bergman has worked in the White House at the

13、 Office of Science and Technology Policy,managing the Quadrennial Energy Review and handling the methane measurement portfolio,and at the Council on Environmental Quality,working on carbon regulation.Bergman entered the federal government in 2009 as a Science and Technology Policy Fellow with the Am

14、erican Association for the Advancement of Science,after working in high energy physics.Acknowledgements We thank Stu Iler,who initially developed the platform for harmonizing outlooks.Thanks also to Erin Campbell for her early work on this years analysis.We also thank those who assisted by providing

15、 data and context,including Matthias Kimmel and Rodrigo Quintero at BNEF;Michael Cohen and Jorge Blazquez at bp;April Ross at ExxonMobil;Paul Andrew Holtom,Astrid Nvik,Ottar Skagen,and Eirik Waerness at Equinor;Tim Gould,Laura Cozzi,and Pawel Olejarnik at IEA;and Suehiro Shigeru at IEEJ.About RFFRes

16、ources for the Future(RFF)is an independent,nonprofit research institution in Washington,DC.Its mission is to improve environmental,energy,and natural resource decisions through impartial economic research and policy engagement.RFF is committed to being the most widely trusted source of research ins

17、ights and policy solutions leading to a healthy environment and a thriving economy.The views expressed here are those of the individual authors and may differ from those of other RFF experts,its officers,or its directors.Sharing Our WorkOur work is available for sharing and adaptation under an Attri

18、bution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)license.You can copy and redistribute our material in any medium or format;you must give appropriate credit,provide a link to the license,and indicate if changes were made,and you may not apply additional restrictions.You may do so

19、 in any reasonable manner,but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.You may not use the material for commercial purposes.If you remix,transform,or build upon the material,you may not distribute the modified material.For more information,visit https:/creativecommons.org/l

20、icenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.Resources for the FutureiiiHighlightsRecent policy developments in the United States,increased ambition in the European Union,and efforts by other nations are sowing the seeds of an energy transition.Although coal,oil,and gas consumption are at or near their all-time highs glob

21、ally,climate ambition and action are growing in public and private sectors.How quickly,and at what scale,will these seeds bear fruit?Global energy additions have continued,rebounding from the lows of 2020 and the COVID-19 pandemic.In 2021,global coal demand roughly equaled its previous peak,and prel

22、iminary 2022 data from IEA show it reaching an all-time high.Oil and natural gas demand remain at or near their all-time global highs.Clean energy technologies are seeing record levels of investment.This trend will need to accelerate if the world is to have any chance of limiting global mean tempera

23、ture rise to 1.5C or 2C by 2100.Under scenarios that achieve these climate targets,wind and solar together produce more electricity in 2050 than all of global electricity generation in 2021.The United States passed major federal climate legislation,but questions about implementation remain.The US su

24、bsidy-based approach is projected to reduce emissions,but the speed and scale of reductions will depend on noncost barriers,such as local acceptance of energy infrastructure and state and local permitting processes.India and China are at different stages of energy development.As India becomes the wo

25、rlds most populous country,its energy demand is projected to grow strongly in the decades ahead,with the energy mix heavily dependent on climate policy ambition.In China,a declining population and slowing economic growth lead to stagnant or declining energy demand,with a declining reliance on fossil

26、 fuels.Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy TransitionivContents1.Introduction 12.Key Findings 33.In Focus 133.1.Whither Peak Oil and Gas Demand?133.2.Assessing Regional Growth Trends for Wind and Solar 163.3.Fuels of the Future 183.3.1.Electricity 193.3.2.Hydrogen 213.3.3.Biomas

27、s 224.Data and Methods 245.Statistics 286.Endnotes 37Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition11.IntroductionThe future of the global energy system is deeply uncertain,and the choices that are made in the coming years will have enormous consequences for the future of the cl

28、imate and,indeed,human civilization.To understand how our energy system is changing,each year various organizations produce long-term projections that imagine a wide range of futures based on divergent visions about policies,technologies,prices,and geopolitics.Because these projections vary widely a

29、nd depend heavily on their different assumptions and methodologies,they are difficult to compare on an apples-to-apples basis.In this report,we apply a detailed harmonization process to compare 14 scenarios across seven energy outlooks published in 2022.We also include BPs Energy Outlook 2023,which

30、was published in January 2023.Taken together,these scenarios offer a broad scope of potential changes to the energy system as envisioned by some of its most knowledgeable organizations.Table 1 shows the historical data sets,outlooks,and scenarios examined here;details are provided in Section 4.A bri

31、ef description of our methodology appears under Data and Methods(Section 4),with select data indicators under Statistics(Section 5).For the full methodology,data sets,and interactive graphing tools,visit www.rff.org/geo.Table 1.Outlooks and Scenarios Examined in This ReportSourceData set or outlookS

32、cenario(s)YearsGrubler(2008)Historical18001970IEA(2022)Historical19702020BNEF(2022)New Energy Outlook 2022Energy Transition Scenario(ETS)Net Zero Scenario(NZS)To 2050BP(2023)Outlook for Energy 2023New MomentumAcceleratedNet ZeroTo 2050Equinor(2022)Energy Perspectives 2022WallsBridgesTo 2050ExxonMobi

33、l(2022)2022 Energy OutlookReferenceTo 2050IEA(2022)World Energy Outlook 2022Stated Policies(STEPS)Announced Pledges(APS)Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)To 2050IEEJ(2022)Energy Outlook 2023(published in 2022)ReferenceAdvanced TechnologiesTo 2050OPEC(2022)World Oil Outlook 2022ReferenceTo 2045Resources

34、 for the Future2Throughout the figures included in this report,we use a consistent labeling system that distinguishes the different scenarios(see Table 2):For“Reference”scenarios,which assume limited or no new policies,we use a long-dashed line.This set comprises Reference scenarios from ExxonMobil,

35、IEEJ,and OPEC.For“Evolving Policies”scenarios,which assume that policies and technologies develop according to recent trends and/or the expert views of the team producing the outlook,we use solid lines.This set comprises BNEF ETS,BP New Momentum,and IEA STEPS.Although they do not follow the same set

36、s of assumptions,we also include Equinor Walls and IEEJ Advanced Technologies scenarios in this group because their trajectories for carbon dioxide(CO2)emissions are similar to those in other Evolving Policies scenarios.For IEA APS,which assumes that governments implement all announced energy and cl

37、imate policies,we use a dot-dash line.For“Ambitious Climate”scenarios,which are built around limiting global mean temperature rise below 2C by 2100,we use short-dashed lines.Just one scenario met this definition:BPs Accelerated Transition.For Ambitious Climate scenarios,designed to limit global mean

38、 temperature rise to 1.5C by 2100 or net-zero emissions by 2050,we use a dotted line.This set includes BNEF NZS,BP Net Zero,Equinor Bridges,and IEA NZE.Figures and tables in this report sometimes refer to regional groupings of“East”and“West.”i Table 3 provides those regional groupings.i This year,re

39、gional data were limited for roughly half of the scenarios,making it impossible to create consistent“East”and“West”groupings for many scenarios.Table 2.Legend for Scenario TypesReferenceEvolving PoliciesAmbitious Climate(2C)Ambitious Climate(1.5C)Exxon-Mobil BNEF ETS BP Accel.BNEF NZS IEEJ Reference

40、 BP New Momentum BP Net Zero OPEC Reference Equinor Walls Equinor Bridges IEA APS IEA NZE IEA STEPS IEEJ AdvancedTable 3.Regional Definitions for“East”and“West”“East”Africa,Asia-Pacific,Middle East“West”Americas,Europe,EurasiaGlobal Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition32.Key

41、FindingsDespite pledges from governments and major corporations around the world to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,the world is mostly continuing its long history of adding to,rather than transitioning away from,older energy sources.Although policymakers,civil society,and business leaders have begu

42、n sowing the seeds of the energy transition,much more action will be required to ensure that these seeds bear fruit at the scale and speed necessary to avert the worst effects of climate change.Global investment in clean energy technologies,led by renewable power and electric transportation,grew to

43、an estimated$1.1 trillion in 2022,up 31 percent from the prior year.11 And yet,preliminary data indicate that world CO2 emissions grew by 1 percent that same year,surpassing their 2019 peak.12 Such trends illustrate the immense scale of the global energy system and the challenge of shifting it not j

44、ust toward clean sources but also away from polluting sources.At the same time,more and more policymakers and private sector leaders are making commitments to reduce emissions to net zero in the decades ahead.These commitments are shifting the energy system at national and regional scales,particular

45、ly in developed economies in Europe and North America.Nonetheless,the projections included in this analysis,and those prepared by other experts and organizations,1315 demonstrate clearly that the world needs to match words with actions to reduce emissions and limit global warming to 2C,let alone 1.5

46、C,by the end of the century.Figure 1.Global Primary Energy Demand,by SourceData sources:Grubler,1 IEA,7 and IEA.10Resources for the Future4Although emissions and fossil fuel consumption remain at or near their all-time highs globally,some regionsparticularly Europeappear to have entered a true energ

47、y transition,with fossil fuel sources being displaced at large scale by cleaner technologies.Russias invasion of Ukraine and the resulting energy insecurity have accelerated Europes shift away from fossil fuels.Europes progress in reducing emissions has been driven by its pioneering carbon market,al

48、ong with other policies that support the deployment of renewable electricity,encourage low-or zero-emissions transportation options,and levy high taxes on fuels such as diesel and gasoline.However,the regions energy transition has come with challenges,some of which have been exacerbated by the Russi

49、an invasion of Ukraine.For example,most European nations have needed to increase their reliance on coal-fired electricity to ensure reliable power supplies in the face of high prices and uncertain supplies for natural gas.In the European Union,coal demand grew by 14 percent in 2021,following the COV

50、ID-19 pandemic lows,but is projected to grow again by 7 percent in 2022.16Looking forward,Europes policy framework is likely to drive deep reductions in the use of coal and other fossil fuels in the coming years.For example,ExxonMobils Reference and IEAs STEPS project that the share of fossil fuels

51、in Europes primary energy mix falls from 6870 percent in 2021 to 5962 percent by 2030,followed by further reductions in subsequent years.Figure 2.Primary Energy Demand in Europe,by SourceData source:BP Statistical Review of Energy.Excludes nonmarketed biomass.Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Se

52、eds of an Energy Transition5Negative emissions technologies(NETs)such as direct air captureand carbon capture and storage(CCS)play a large role in every Ambitious Climate scenario examined here.As long as fossil fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions remain high,achieving international targets of 1.5

53、C or 2C by 2100 will become ever more reliant on large-scale NETs,CCS,and perhaps even more controversial technologies such as solar geoengineering.17Over roughly the past 30 years,energy-related CO2 emissions grew by almost two-thirds.By 2050,less than 30 years from today,projections range from fur

54、ther emissions growth of 10 percent to emissions reductions of greater than 100 percent,as in Equinors Bridges,which envisions net-negative global CO2 emissions by midcentury.CCS plays a substantial role in many scenarios,including some with relatively modest climate policy assumptions.By 2050,CCS i

55、s projected to capture at least 1 gigatonne of CO2 per year in Reference Scenarios from Equinor and ExxonMobil,Evolving Policies scenarios from IEA and bp,and all Ambitious Climate scenarios.The largest volumes of CCS are seen in the four 1.5C scenarios,where annual capture rates exceed 5 gigatonnes

56、(including NETs and CCS that avoid emissions)more than all energy-related CO2 emissions from the United States in 2021.Challenges associated with this scale of CCS deployment include costs,social acceptance of associated infrastructure,and protocols for monitoring,reporting,and verification to ensur

57、e that captured carbon remains safely stored for centuries to come.18Figure 3.Global Energy-Related CO2 EmissionsNotes:Negative emissions include direct air capture and biomass energy with CCS.We exclude negative emissions from land-use change and“nature-based solutions”(e.g.,afforestation).Resource

58、s for the Future6The future of global energy demand varies considerably depending on assumptions about technological innovation,energy efficiency,and government policy.Under several Reference and Evolving Policies scenarios,global energy demand rises to nearly 700 QBtu by midcentury.But under other

59、scenarios,particularly those that achieve net-zero emissions by 2050,global energy demand declines considerably as global demand for energy services is met much more efficiently.All scenarios envision lower coal consumption in 2050 than 2021,but liquids consumption is higher under four of the 14 sce

60、narios considered here.Natural gas demand is higher in 2050 under eight scenarios.As in previous years,wind and solar grow at dramatic rates under all scenarios,but the range is quite wide.By 2050,wind and solar account for 10 percent(ExxonMobil)to roughly 50 percent(Equinor Bridges)of global primar

61、y energy demand.Recent announcements related to nuclear fusion technology have generated excitement across the energy world,19 but no outlooks examined here specifically consider its potential during the projection period.Compared with 5 percent in 2021,nuclears share in 2050 ranges from 5 percent(I

62、EEJ Reference)to 14 percent(BNEF and BP Net Zero).Under three of the four net-zero scenarios,energy consumption from nuclear more than doubles by 2050,driven in some cases by the production of hydrogen for end uses in other sectors.Figure 4.World Primary Energy Mix in 2021 and Projections for 2050No

63、tes:Ordered from highest to lowest levels of fossil fuel consumption in 2050.“Liquids”excludes biofuels for BNEF.“Other”includes hydro for BNEF,and wind and solar for Equinor,IEEJ,and OPEC.Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition7Global electricity demand is projected to g

64、row between 62 and 185 percent by 2050 compared with 2021 levels.The share of fossil fuels in the electricity mix declines from 59 percent in 2021 to 255 percent by 2050,but in some Reference scenarios,the aggregate level of fossil fuels used for power generation grows.Under most Ambitious Climate s

65、cenarios,wind and solar together generate more electricity in 2050 than all sources combined in 2021.In two scenarios(BNEF NZE,IEA NZE),wind or solar alone produces more electricity than all sources globally in 2021.Under all scenarios other than IEEJ Reference,electricity from coal,todays largest g

66、eneration source,declines considerably by 2050,while natural gas consumption falls in just over half of the scenarios.Under most Ambitious Climate scenarios,use of coal and natural gas continues in the power sector through midcentury but is paired with CCS to reduce emissions.In some outlooks,hydrog

67、en begins to play a substantial role in the power sector by midcentury,exceeding 1,000 TWh of global generation by 2050 in four scenarios(BP Net Zero,Equinor Bridges,IEEJ Advanced Technology,and IEA NZE).However,most scenarios that envision a major role for hydrogen in the future energy system proje

68、ct its playing a more substantial role for other applications,particularly industrial heat and long-distance transportation.Figure 5.World Electricity MixNotes:2050 scenarios arranged in declining order of fossil fuel electricity generation.“Other”includes oil,geothermal,and marine.For BNEF it also

69、includes hydro.Resources for the Future8Russias invasion of Ukraine has reinforced Europes efforts to reduce fossil fuel consumption and associated CO2 emissions.In the United States,the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act is also expected to shift the energy system away from fossil fuels and tow

70、ard cleaner sources.The effects of these shifts in Europe and the United States can be seen by comparing natural gas demand in last years projections(2022 for BP20 and 2021 for IEA21)with the most recent outlooks.Whats more,projections for natural gas demand in the rest of the world are considerably

71、 lower than in the equivalent scenarios from last year.How do these projections compare with those from a decade ago?Consider IEAs 2012 New Policies Scenario(NPS,roughly equivalent to todays STEPS),which projected that global natural gas demand in 2020 would be 130 QBtu.In 2021,global demand exceede

72、d this projection by roughly 6 percent,reflecting a growing market for global liquefied natural gas and abundant low-cost supplies of shale gas in the United States,among other things.The 2012 IEA NPS projected global natural gas demand of 152 QBtu in 2030.This years projections,however,envision muc

73、h slower or even declining growth,reaching 143 Qbtu under IEA STEPS and falling to 126 Qbtu under the IEA APS by 2030.Although they are well below projections from a decade ago,the current Evolving Policies scenarios envision substantially higher natural gas demand than the levels associated with ac

74、hieving international climate goals.For example,global natural gas demand in 2050 in Reference and Evolving Policies scenarios ranges from 142 to 191 QBtu,about three times the level envisioned in Ambitious Climate scenarios,which fall between 38 and 65 QBtu by 2050.Figure 6.Previous and Current Pro

75、jected Natural Gas Demand from BP and IEANote:Historical data from BP.22Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition9Global demand for coal has also been revised downward this year.However,near-and medium-term concerns over natural gas supplies have resulted in an upward revis

76、ion for Europe in the IEAs STEPS and little change in BPs New Momentum scenario.The transition away from coal is particularly sharp in the United States,where 2030 demand under this years IEA STEPS is projected to be roughly half the level projected just last year.Outside Europe and the United State

77、s,projections of future coal demand have also been revised downward in IEA STEPS and BP New Momentum.Although global coal demand was projected to begin declining by 2030 or before under last years scenarios,that decline occurs more quickly in this years projections.Expectations for future coal deman

78、d have changed even more significantly during the past decade.In 2012,the IEA NPS projected global coal demand of 162 QBtu in 2020,which is roughly 7 percent higher than the actual amount consumed in 2021(2020 demand was even lower,but this was largely due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic).By

79、 2030,the 2012 IEA NPS projected global coal demand rising to 166 QBtu.However,no scenario examined here reaches this level by 2030.The highest projection for global coal demand in 2030 comes from IEEJs Reference scenario,which reaches 156 QBtu in that year.Nonetheless,the projected coal demand in R

80、eference and Evolving Policies scenarios vastly exceeds the levels needed to limit global warming to 1.5C or 2C by 2100.In 2050,most Ambitious Climate scenarios project global coal demand between 15 and 17 QBtu,compared with a range from 77 to 156 QBtu under Reference and Evolving Policies scenarios

81、.Figure 7.Previous and Current Projected Coal Demand from BP and IEANote:Historical data from BP.22Resources for the Future10Under most scenarios,global oil demand is considerably lower by 2050 than it is today.Under Reference scenarios from ExxonMobil,IEEJ,and OPEC,oil consumption plateaus in the 2

82、030s and remains at or above 100 mb/d through 2050,a level that is incompatible with achieving international climate targets.Evolving Policies scenarios illustrate a fairly wide range of future consumption,but scenarios that limit global temperature rise to 1.5C by 2100 project that oil demand falls

83、 to roughly 20 to 25 mb/d by midcentury.Future oil demand varies considerably across regions and scenarios.For example,all three of BPs and IEAs scenarios project demand in the Asia-Pacific region to peak by 2030 and then decline,whereas Reference scenarios from ExxonMobil and IEEJ project regional

84、demand growth through 2050.In China,demand peaks by 2030 under all scenarios other than OPECs Reference case(ExxonMobil does not publish China-specific projections).In India,demand grows under all Reference and Evolving Policies scenarios but begins declining in the 2030s or 2040s under Ambitious Cl

85、imate scenarios.In North America,oil demand peaks in 2025 to 2030 and falls under all scenarios.However,the rate of decline varies dramatically between scenarios.By 2050,North American oil demand ranges from highs around 16 mb/d under ExxonMobils Reference and IEA STEPS to lows of just 3 mb/d under

86、Ambitious Climate scenarios.In Latin America,demand remains relatively flat through 2050 under Reference and Evolving Policies scenarios but falls by more than half under most Ambitious Climate scenarios.Figure 8.World Oil DemandNote:Where outlooks do not provide projections in physical units(mb/d),

87、we convert to mb/d using a factor of 1.832 QBtu per mb/d.Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition11Energy demand in China has spiked over recent decades,roughly tripling since 2000.However,Chinas population is expected to begin declining in the years ahead,reducing the pro

88、jected rate of economic growth.As a result,primary energy demand in China is lower by midcentury under most scenarios examined here,particularly the Ambitious Climate scenarios.This is a marked change from last year,when more than half of scenarios projected considerable growth in demand by midcentu

89、ry.23By 2050,coal demand in China is projected to be well below 2021 levels,falling by 28 percent (IEEJ Reference)to 93 percent(BP Net Zero).Chinas oil demand also declines considerably in all scenarios except OPEC Reference.Under IEA STEPS and APS,oil demand by 2050 falls by 8 and 48 percent,respec

90、tively,highlighting the gap between Chinas current and expected government polices and announced climate goals.Under Ambitious Climate scenarios,Chinas oil demand declines by roughly 60 to 80 percent.Natural gas also declines considerably under Ambitious Climate scenarios but grows under most other

91、scenarios.Nuclear in China grows dramatically under all scenarios.In 2021,nuclear accounted for roughly 3 percent of Chinas primary energy mix.By 2050,the absolute level of nuclear power more than triples under most scenarios and accounts for roughly 10 percent of the mix under Evolving Policies sce

92、narios,such as IEA STEPS.Nuclears share is even higher under Ambitious Climate scenarios,contributing 13 to 22 percent of Chinas primary energy by 2050.Wind and solar account for the bulk of renewables growth in China,with more modest growth from hydropower.Compared with 3 percent in 2021,wind and s

93、olar are projected to contribute 15 percent or more of Chinas primary energy by 2050 in scenarios that report these data.Figure 9.Primary Energy Demand in ChinaNotes:Region-specific data not available for BNEF,ExxonMobil,or IEA NZE.Projections ordered from highest to lowest levels of fossil fuel dem

94、and.Resources for the Future12In 2023,India is expected to surpass China to become the worlds most populous nation.24 As it continues to grow and modernize,Indias energy demand is projected to grow under all scenarios examined here.The composition of that growth,however,varies widely across scenario

95、s.Under Reference and Evolving Policies scenarios,Indias demand for all fossil fuels grows through 2050,but under Ambitious Climate scenarios,it mostly declines.In 2021,Indias energy mix was dominated by coal(46 percent),oil(23 percent),and biomass(22 percent).By 2050,Indias coal demand grows under

96、half of the scenarios examined here,ranging from more than doubling(IEEJ Reference)to falling by 80 percent(Equinor Bridges).Oil demand increases under all but three scenarios,one of which is the IEA APS,which indicates the ambition of Indias announced(but not yet implemented)efforts to reduce emiss

97、ions.Indias use of biomass energy,which has been dominated by traditional biomass(i.e.,locally gathered and combusted materials such as wood and dung),stays at a fairly consistent level,around 8 to 10 QBtu under most scenarios.However,this consistency masks considerable changes as traditional biomas

98、s is displaced by modern bioenergy(e.g.,wood pellets,biofuels)in certain sectors of the economy.Nuclear,wind,and solar grow dramatically in India under all scenarios.These three sources combined accounted for just 3 percent of Indias primary energy mix in 2021.By 2050,they grow to 15 percent or more

99、 under most scenarios,reaching as high as 50 to 60 percent of Indias energy mix under Ambitious Climate scenarios from BP and Equinor.Figure 10.Primary Energy Demand in IndiaNotes:Region-specific data not available for BNEF,ExxonMobil,or IEA NZE.Projections ordered from highest to lowest levels of f

100、ossil fuel consumption.Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition133.In Focus3.1.Whither Peak Oil and Gas Demand?An energy transition that addresses climate change must involve shifting energy demand away from oil and gas,but prospects for the repeatedly predicted time of“pe

101、ak oil”have remained elusive.Both IEAs and BPs scenarios have long featured steadily increasing consumption of both oil and gas,except in their most aggressive decarbonization scenarios.However,those organizations recently released scenarios have begun to break from that pattern,indicating shifting

102、views among analysts and institutions.Importantly,these updated scenarios incorporate major changes to energy markets that occurred in 2022,including Russias invasion of Ukraine and the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States.Figure 11 shows both IEAs and BPs scenarios for oil an

103、d gas demand over time.In a notable change from past scenarios,now for the first time,to our knowledge,all of BPs scenarios feature lower oil demand in 2025 than in 2019(see top left panel),suggesting that global oil demand may already be peaking.By contrast,as recently as last year,BPs highest-foss

104、il case(New Momentum)had oil demand peaking in 2030.Meanwhile,IEA STEPS continues to foresee rising and elevated levels of oil demand growth through 2040(bottom left panel),although the NZE scenario features more aggressive declines in oil demand by 2030 than any of BPs scenarios.On natural gas,IEAs

105、 and BPs long-term prospects are more closely aligned,with growth and decline in gas demand possible through 2050,depending on the scenario.Of BPs scenarios,only in the Net Zero case have we already passed“peak gas.”As for IEA,its 2022 STEPS features roughly flat gas demand through 2050,breaking fro

106、m its 2021 projection,which featured modest but persistent growth in the coming decades.Resources for the Future14When peak oil demand or peak gas demand does occur,what regions might we expect to play the largest roles in this part of global decarbonization?Figure 12 tells this story by plotting BP

107、s scenarios of oil and gas consumption across six regions that constitute global demand.Oil demand broadly declines in North America and Europe-Eurasia but rises somewhat in Asia-Pacific before peaking toward the end of this decade,then declining sharply.Natural gas consumption also declines broadly

108、 in North America and Europe-Eurasia,but the alternative scenarios envision very different pathways of natural gas demand in Asia,the primary driver of uncertainty in long-term global gas demand and the possibility of peak gas.Across the low,medium,and high fossil scenarios,Asia-Pacific gas demand e

109、ither peaks in 2030 or 2035 or continues to rise through 2050.These ranges demonstrate large uncertainties in the timing of peak oil and peak gas.Nonetheless,revisions in this years scenarios from BP and IEA highlight the potential for an acceleration of the energy transition.Figure 11.Global Oil an

110、d Natural Gas Demand,Current and Previous Outlooks from BP(top)and IEA(bottom)Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition15Figure 12.BP Pathways of Oil(top)and Gas(bottom)Demand,by RegionResources for the Future163.2.Assessing Regional Growth Trends for Wind and SolarIn recen

111、t years,growth in renewable energyespecially wind and solarhas achieved significant momentum.In Ambitious Climate scenarios,renewable generation sources are enabling the shift away from fossil fuels.However,the pace of growth varies widely across scenarios.In the most conservative scenario(IEEJ Refe

112、rence),wind and solar power generation is expected to triple by 2050,but in the most ambitious scenario(BNEF NZS),it is expected to grow by a factor of 21(Figure 13).Several factors have contributed to these renewables accelerating growth,including policy support in critical regions and an overall d

113、ecline in capital costs for equipment.However,projected growth is not evenly distributed across regions,especially in the near term.Only a few regions are expected to contribute most of the growth in wind and solar generation through 2030.Energy security concerns due to Russias invasion of Ukraine h

114、ave spurred European countries to accelerate their shift away from imported fossil fuels,particularly natural gas,and toward renewables.In May 2022,the European Commission presented the REPowerEU plan,which aim to increase the share of renewables in primary energy consumption from 40 to 45 percent b

115、y 2030.25 The Commission estimates that the renewable energy share of electricity generation will reach 69 percent by 2030 in the plan.In the United States,the Inflation Reduction Act has provided support for renewables.26 The bill extends existing technology-specific energy investment and productio

116、n tax credits through 2024,at which point the tax credits will become Figure 13.Historical and Projected Wind and Solar Generation through 2050Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition17emissions-based rather than technology-specific.Additional measures,including the Enviro

117、nmental Protection Agencys$27 billion Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund and the$40 billion in loan authority provided to the Department of Energys Loan Program Office,seek to mobilize private capital for clean energy projects.Chinas recent 14th Five-Year Plan includes upwardly revised goals in renewable

118、 power growth and targets a 50 percent increase in renewable power generation from 2020 to 2025.27 A suite of policy incentives,available land,and several planned gigawatt-and utility-scale clean energy bases are expected to boost Chinas renewable energy.All scenarios(except Equinor Bridges)locate m

119、ost of the growth in wind and solar generation in China,North America,and the European Union over the next decade(Figure 14).These regions are projected to account for 62 percent(Equinor Walls)to 83 percent(BP Accelerated)of all such growth.However,the aggregate level of wind and solar deployment in

120、 China,North America,and the European Union differs considerably between most Reference and Evolving Policies scenarios(Equinor Walls,BP New Momentum,IEA STEPS,IEA APS)and the Ambitious Climate scenarios(BP Accelerated and BP Net Zero).This gap suggests the need for additional policy support for dis

121、placing fossil-based resources if climate targets are to be met,as well as policies addressing issues such as regulatory and permitting challenges,transmission,and private financing that can accelerate wind and solar deployment.Figure 14.Growth in Wind and Solar Power Generation,by Region,20192030No

122、tes:Equinor and BP data in Figure 14 use 2019 as base year.IEA data uses 2020 as base year because of data availability.Resources for the Future18The divide between Evolving Policy and Ambitious Climate scenarios becomes more apparent in the long term,from 2030 to 2050,especially outside the United

123、States,European Union,and China(Figure 15).Across scenarios,the rest of the world is expected to contribute 39 to 66 percent of the growth in wind and solar generation from 2030 to 2050.However,Evolving Policies scenarios project that growth in these regions will be less than half of the total gener

124、ation necessary for meeting net-zero goals.To remain on track for net zero,much greater clean energy investment in emerging and developing economies is necessary.According to IEA,the World Bank,and the World Economic Forum,investment in emerging and developing countries will need to increase sevenfo

125、ld,from less than$150 billion in 2020 to more than$1 trillion by 2030.283.3.Fuels of the FutureIn a future where fossil fuels play a smaller role in the primary energy mix,new energy sources will be needed to fulfill essential energy services.The three fuels that play the largest role in decarboniza

126、tion across scenarios are electricity,hydrogen,and bioenergy particularly the forms of these sources that involve low,zero,or even negative greenhouse gas emissions.Of course,these fuels are already available:electricity is used throughout the economy,hydrogen for refining and in chemicals productio

127、n,and bioenergy for select industrial,electricity and heat generation,and transportation applications.We examine the outlook for each energy source in this section.Figure 15.Growth in Wind and Solar Power Generation,by Region,20302050Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transitio

128、n193.3.1.ElectricityElectricity generation is shown in Figure 16,and electricity consumption as a fraction of total final consumption is shown in Figure 17.In most cases,electricity generation is higher in the Ambitious Climate scenarios.The two highest levels of generation,by a significant margin,a

129、re the BNEF and IEA Net Zero scenarios.This is also the case for the consumption fraction,which exceeds 50 percent for IEA NZE and 45 percent for BNEF NZS.Interestingly,generation is also quite high in the IEA APS scenario.Figure 16.World Electricity Generation,All SourcesNote:ExxonMobil presents el

130、ectricity generation data in net generation,whereas other outlooks provide data in gross generation terms(i.e.,before on-site electricity consumption)Resources for the Future20One way to visualize the relationship between electrification and decarbonization is to plot electricity generation alongsid

131、e carbon dioxide emissions.Figure 18 shows the values for the year 2050 in each scenario.Figure 17.Share of Electricity in World Final Energy ConsumptionFigure 18.World Electricity Generation and Net CO2 Emissions in 2050Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition21Here,we ag

132、ain see the highest levels of generation in the IEA and BP Net Zero scenarios.Although most of the points reflect a roughly linear relationship,with generation increasing as emissions decline,the Equinor Bridges scenario has generation comparable to scenarios with much higher emissions while achievi

133、ng negative overall emissions.This likely reflects the fact that Equinors outlook does not include electricity used for hydrogen production in its measure of electricity generation.In addition to high levels of electricity generation,these scenarios all have substantial hydrogen production(as does t

134、he IEEJ Advanced Technologies scenario).Among the Evolving Policies scenarios for which data are available,the two scenarios with the largest hydrogen production have electricity as a higher fraction of consumption.Although isolating the underlying source of hydrogen in these scenarios(e.g.,electrol

135、ysis versus steam reforming)without further investigation is difficult,it appears that hydrogen produced from electrolysis is leading to increased electricity consumption in these scenarios.ii The hydrogen production in the IEEJ Advanced Technologies scenario may also not cause as large an increase

136、in electricity generation because the increased demand from hydrogen production is offset by reductions in demand due to energy efficiency.We explore hydrogen outlooks further in the next section.3.3.2.HydrogenHydrogen use(in the scenarios that include it)is shown in Figure 19.The three scenarios wh

137、ere hydrogen plays the largest roles are BNEF and BP Net Zero(both 10 percent of final energy consumption in 2050),and Net Zero(IEA Net Zero(6 percent).Evolving Policies scenarios such as the IEEJ Advanced Technologies and the IEA APS include some hydrogen consumption but considerably less than thei

138、r two ambitious scenarios.Projections from BP generally show a higher share of hydrogen in final energy consumption than other scenarios,but this is partly the result of BPs historical data,which shows hydrogen playing a larger role than other historical datasets.The cause of the underlying discrepa

139、ncy in historical data is unclear,and may result from different accounting or reporting protocols across organizations.ii Based on internal communication,we understand that Equinors outlook does not include electricity used for hydrogen production in its measure of electricity generation,which makes

140、 direct comparison with other scenarios difficult.Resources for the Future22Although most outlooks do not report how the hydrogen is produced,some do provide these projections.In 2019,BP reports that 99.99 percent of all hydrogen production came from fossil fuels,primarily steam methane reforming.In

141、 its outlook,BP projects that the share of fossil-based hydrogen production decreases to 59,36,and 28 percent by 2050 under its New Momentum,Accelerated,and Net Zero scenarios,respectively.In its Net Zero scenario,BP projects that in 2050,wind and solar provide two-thirds of the energy to produce hy

142、drogen,primarily through water electrolysis.Under IEAs STEPS,68 percent of the 24 metric tons of low-emissions hydrogen production comes from water electrolysis by 2050,with the remainder coming from fossil fuels with CCUS.Under the APS and NZE,water electrolysis plays a much larger role,producing r

143、oughly three-quarters of all low-emissions hydrogen by 2050.3.3.3.BiomassPrimary energy consumption from biomass is shown in Figure 20,and its share of the total is shown in Figure 21,including both traditional biomass(e.g.,wood,dung,and agricultural by-products)and marketed,commercial-scale biomass

144、(e.g.,wood pellets)but excludes biofuels.Compared with hydrogen and electricity,biomass has very different patterns.Please note that we have not been able to completely harmonize these data,so the overall levels and shares of primary energy are not aligned across sources,as seen in the variety of st

145、arting points for outlooks in years 2025 and 2030.Even taking into account the calibration issue,the IEA scenarios show the highest absolute levels of biomass consumption,regardless of scenario type.Figure 19.Share of Hydrogen in World Final Energy ConsumptionGlobal Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Se

146、eds of an Energy Transition23Figure 20.World Biomass Primary Energy ConsumptionFigure 21.Share of Biomass in World Primary Energy ConsumptionResources for the Future24Unlike electricity,biomass does not appear to have a strong relationship between consumption and emissions(Figure 22).This likely ref

147、lects assumptions about the economics and availability of biomass.Moreover,except for the IEA scenarios,most projections show a leveling off or even a decrease in the absolute level of biomass consumption.Some of this reflects an offsetting decline in traditional biomass as more modern forms of biom

148、ass,such as wood pellets,become more prevalent.4.Data and MethodsIn this paper,we examined projections from the following publications:BNEF:New Energy Outlook 2022 BP:Energy Outlook 2023 Equinor:Energy Perspectives 2022 ExxonMobil:2022 Outlook for Energy IEA:World Energy Outlook 2022 IEEJ:Energy Out

149、look 2022 OPEC:World Oil Outlook 2022These outlooks vary across many dimensions,including differences in modeling techniques,historical data,economic growth assumptions,and policy scenarios.Generally,scenarios can be grouped into three categories:(1)Reference,which assume no major policy changes;(2)

150、Evolving Policies,which incorporate the modeling teams expectations of policy trends;and(3)alternatives,which are typically based on certain policy targets or technology assumptions.We focus on Ambitious Climate scenarios,a major subset of(3).Table 4 summarizes the scenarios included in this years a

151、nalysis.Figure 22.World Biomass Energy Consumption and Net CO2 Emissions in 2050Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition25Table 4.Sources and ScenariosSourceScenarioGrubler(2008)Historical dataIEA(2022)Historical dataBNF(2022)ETS:Baseline assessment of how the energy secto

152、r may evolve,based primarily on cost projections,with limited new policies.NZS:Achieves net-zero emissions by 2050 with rapid deployment of existing technologies and emergence of new technologies,such as CCS and clean hydrogen.BP(2023)New Momentum:Reflects current policies and“places weight”on achie

153、ving recently announced ambitions for emissions reductions.Accelerated:Emissions fall 75 percent below 2019 levels by 2050,consistent with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC)scenarios limiting warming to 2C by 2100.Net Zero:Emissions fall 95 percent below 2019 levels by 2050,consistent w

154、ith IPCC scenarios limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100.Equinor(2023)Walls:Begins with current policies and assumes that future climate and energy policies slowly become more ambitious.Bridges:A scenario designed around limiting warming to 1.5C by 2100ExxonMobil(2023)Reference:Begins with current market

155、,technology,and policy trends.The extent to which additional energy and climate policies are included is unclear.IEA(2022)Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS):Focuses on what governments“are actually doing,”including existing policies and those under development.Roughly consistent with 2.5C warming by 21

156、00.Announced Pledges Scenario(APS):Includes announced climate commitments by governments and nongovernmental entities,including net-zero pledges,regardless of implementation status.Roughly consistent with 1.7C to 1.8C warming by 2100.Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE):This follows an updated roadmap to

157、 net-zero emissions by 2050,consistent with 1.5C warming by 2100.Also achieves UN Sustainable Development Goals,such as universal energy access by 2030.IEEJ(2022)Reference:Uses historical trends to evaluate future changes in current policies and technologies.Advanced Technologies:Includes“maximum ca

158、rbon dioxide emissions reduction”measures,new technology deployment,and additional energy security efforts.OPEC(2022)Reference:Incorporates policies that have been enacted.Assumes some future policy changes,but details are not specified.Resources for the Future26Variations in underlying assumptions

159、about the future of policies,technologies,and markets produce useful variation among outlooks,allowing analysts to view a wide range of potential energy futures.However,outlooks also have important methodological differences that can complicate direct comparisons and reduce the ability to draw insig

160、hts.One major difference is the choice of reporting units.For primary energy,outlooks use QBtu,million tonnes of oil equivalent(mtoe),or exajoules.In this report,we standardize all units to QBtu.For fuel-specific data,outlooks use million barrels per day(mbd)or million barrels of oil equivalent per

161、day(mboed)for liquid fuels,billion cubic meters(bcm)or trillion cubic feet(tcf)for natural gas,and million tonnes of coal-equivalent(mtce)or short tons for coal.Table 5 presents the reporting units for each outlook,and Table 6 provides relevant conversion factors.Table 5.Units of Energy Consumption,

162、by OutlookBNEFBPEquinorExxonMobil IEAIEEJOPECPrimary energy unitsPJEJmtoeqBtuEJmtoemboedFuel-or sector-specific units LiquidsNAmbdNAqBtumbdmtoembd OilPJmbdmbdqBtumbdmtoembd BiofuelsNAmbdmtoeqBtumboedmtoembd Natural gasPJbcmbcmqBtubcmmtoemboed CoalNAEJmtoeqBtumtcemtoemboed ElectricityTWhTWhTWhqBtuTWh

163、TWhNANotes:Units are per year unless otherwise noted.“NA”indicates that fuel-specific data are not available for a given source.Table 6.Conversion Factors for Major Energy UnitsPrimary energyMultiply byNatural gasMultiply byCoalMultiply bymtoe to QBtu0.0397 bcm to bcfd0.0968 mtce to short ton 1.102m

164、boed1 to QBtu1.976 bcm to tcf0.0353 mtce to mtoe0.7EJ to QBtu0.948Notes:There is no agreed-upon factor for boe.IEA reports that typical factors range from 7.15 to 7.40 boe per toe,and OPEC uses a conversion factor of 7.33 boe per toe.We derive 1.976 QBtu/mboed by multiplying 49.8 mtoe/mboed(=1 toe/7

165、.33 boe*365 days per year)by 0.03968 QBtu/mtoe.Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition27A second difference among outlooks is that assumptions about the energy content in a given physical unit of fuel result in different conversion factors for data presented in energy uni

166、ts(e.g.,QBtu)and those presented in physical units(e.g.,mbd or bcm).Among the outlooks we examine,these assumptions vary by up to 10 percent.Although conversion unit variations may appear small,they are amplified when applied across the massive scale of global energy systems,particularly over long t

167、ime horizons.A third difference results from varying decisions about including nonmarketed biomass,such as locally gathered wood and dung,in historical data and projections for primary energy consumption.In previous years,BP and the US Energy Information Administration(EIA)had not included these sou

168、rces in their projections.However,BPs Energy Outlook 2023 does include nonmarketed biomass,allowing for enhanced comparability(the EIA publishes its International Energy Outlook every two years and did not publish it in 2022).Yet another difference relates to comparing the energy content of fossil a

169、nd nonfossil fuels.The primary energy content of oil,natural gas,and coal is relatively well understood and similar across outlooks.However,a substantial portion of that embodied energy is wasted as heat during combustion.Because nonfossil fuels,such as hydroelectricity,wind,and solar,do not generat

170、e substantial amounts of waste heat,identifying a comparable metric for primary energy is difficult,and outlooks take various approaches.Other differences in outlooks include(1)different categorizations for liquids fuels and renewable energy,(2)different regional groupings for aggregated data and pr

171、ojections,(3)use of net versus gross calorific values for reporting the energy content of fossil fuels,(4)use of net versus gross generation for reporting electricity data,and(5)whether and how to include flared natural gas in energy consumption data.To address those challenges and allow for a more

172、accurate comparison across outlooks,Newell and Iler29 apply a harmonization process.We update and use it here.For details,see Raimi and Newell.30 Resources for the Future285.StatisticsTable 7.Global IndicatorsPopulation EnergyGDPNet CO2GDP/capitaEnergy/GDPEnergy/CapitaNet CO2/energy$in PPP termsMill

173、ionsqBtu$T,2020BMT$1,000/person1,000 Btu/$1,000 Btu/personMMT/qBtu1990 5,279 350 53 22 10.0 6.6 66.3 64.0 2020 7,749 560 138 32 17.9 4.0 72.3 57.0 2021 7,835 590 145 34 18.5 4.1 75.4 57.0 2050 BP New Momentum 9,735 595 302 25 31.0 2.0 61.2 42.3 BP Accelerated 9,735 465 302 7 31.0 1.5 47.7 15.8 BP Ne

174、t Zero 9,735 417 302 1 31.0 1.4 42.8 2.8 IEA STEPS 9,692 699 336 29 34.7 2.1 72.1 41.4 IEA APS 9,692 595 331 11 34.2 1.8 61.4 19.1 IEA NZE 9,692 504 333 1 34.3 1.5 52.0 1.0 OPEC(2045)9,457 694 295 34 31.2 2.4 73.3 49.0$in MER terms2020 7,749 560 91 32 11.7 6.2 72.3 57.0 2050 BNEF ETS 9,628 596 210 2

175、5 21.8 2.8 61.9 41.3 BNEF NZS 9,628 529 210 0 21.8 2.5 54.9 0.1 Equinor Bridges 9,730 430 186 (1)19.2 2.3 44.2 (1.9)Equinor Walls 9,730 602 185 22 19.0 3.3 61.9 37.0 ExxonMobil 9,700 658 221 25 22.8 3.0 67.8 38.2 IEEJ Advanced Tech 9,597 570 210 17 21.9 2.7 59.4 29.7 IEEJ Reference 9,597 700 210 37

176、21.9 3.3 73.0 52.9 Notes:Historical data from IEA.Net CO2 emissions include positive(gross)and negative emissions from sources such as direct air capture and bioenergy with CCS.CO2 emissions data include fossil fuel combustion and exclude industrial process emissions.Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowin

177、g the Seeds of an Energy Transition29Table 8.World Primary Energy ConsumptionqBtuTotalCoalLiquidsNatural gasNuclearHydroOther renewables196015156421703341990350881316621738202056014916713228157020215901571781392915742050 BNEF ETS5969714214534NA178 BNEF NZS52955416576NA292 BP New Momentum595911391583

178、519154 BP Accelerated4652283834824203 BP Net Zero4171647575826214 Equinor Bridges4301548394519265 Equinor Walls602771541444319164 ExxonMobil658882001784419128 IEA Steps6991061961424423187 IEA APS59545121875326264 IEA NZE5041549386028314 IEEJ Advanced Tech570761251495522144 IEEJ Reference700146209191

179、3421140Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition30Table 9.Liquids Consumption,by RegionWorldAvg.annual growthWestAvg.annual growthEastAvg.annual growthmbdmbdCAAGRmbdmbdCAAGRmbdmbdCAAGR196023ndnd1990721.63.9%50212020910.70.8%41-0.3-0.7%420.72.3%2021970.81.0%43-0.2-0.5%450.82

180、.4%2050202020502020205020202050 BNEF ETS78-0.5-0.5%BNEF NZS23-2.3-4.6%BP New Momentum76-0.5-0.6%28-0.4-1.3%450.10.2%BP Accelerated46-1.5-2.3%14-0.9-3.4%27-0.5-1.5%BP Net Zero26-2.2-4.1%7-1.1-5.9%14-1.0-3.7%Equinor Bridges27-2.2-4.0%Equinor Walls84-0.2-0.3%ExxonMobil1100.60.6%35-0.2-0.5%650.71.4%IEA

181、STEPS1080.50.5%34-0.2-0.6%560.50.9%IEA APS66-0.8-1.1%16-0.8-3.1%35-0.3-0.7%IEA NZE27-2.2-4.0%IEEJ Advanced Tech.68-0.8-1.0%IEEJ Reference1150.80.8%35-0.2-0.5%630.71.3%OPEC(2045)1120.70.7%Notes:“Liquids”includes only oil for BNEF and Equinor;biofuels data were not available.Regional totals may not su

182、m because of different treatment of international aviation and bunker fuels and,for IEA,exclusion of biofuels in regional data.Where volumetric data are not published,we assume a conversion factor of 1.832 QBtu per mbd,or 0.54585 mbd per QBtu.Resources for the Future31Table 10.Natural Gas Consumptio

183、n,by RegionWorldAvg.annual growthWestAvg.annual growthEastAvg.annual growthTCFTCFCAAGRTCFTCFCAAGRTCFTCFCAAGR196015ndnd1990611.54.7%52920201222.02.3%740.71.1%471.35.8%20211282.22.4%770.80.1%501.30.2%2050202020502020205020202050 BNEF ETS1340.40.3%BNEF NZS60-2.1-2.4%BP New Momentum1450.80.6%66-0.3-0.4%

184、791.11.7%BP Accelerated76-1.5-1.6%33-1.4-2.7%44-0.1-0.3%BP Net Zero52-2.3-2.8%23-1.7-3.7%29-0.6-1.6%Equinor Bridges36-2.9-4.0%Equinor Walls1330.40.3%ExxonMobil1651.41.0%730.00.0%911.51.7%IEA STEPS1310.30.2%61-0.4-0.6%690.7-0.3%IEA APS80-1.4-1.4%34-1.3-2.5%45-0.1-1.6%IEA NZE35-2.9-4.1%IEEJ Advanced T

185、ech.1380.50.4%IEEJ Reference1771.81.2%840.40.4%891.42.1%OPEC(2045)1561.10.8%Note:Where volumetric data are not available,we assume a conversion factor of 0.923 TCF per QBtu.Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition32Table 11.Coal Consumption,by RegionWorldAvg.annual growthW

186、estAvg.annual growthEastAvg.annual growthQBtuQBtuCAAGRQBtuQBtuCAAGRQBtuQBtuCAAGR196056ndnd1990881.11.5%523620201492.01.8%26-0.9-2.3%1232.94.2%20211572.21.9%28-0.8-1.9%1283.04.2%2050202020502020205020202050 BNEF ETS97-1.7-1.4%BNEF NZS55-3.1-3.3%BP New Momentum91-1.9-1.6%9-0.6-3.4%82-1.4-1.3%BP Accele

187、rated22-4.2-6.1%2-0.8-8.5%20-3.4-5.8%BP Net Zero16-4.4-7.2%1-0.8-9.7%14-3.6-6.9%Equinor Bridges15-4.5-7.4%Equinor Walls77-2.4-2.2%ExxonMobil88-2.0-1.7%6-0.7-4.9%82-1.4-1.3%IEA STEPS106-1.4-1.1%12-0.5-2.6%94-0.9-0.9%IEA APS45-3.5-3.9%7-0.6-4.4%38-2.8-3.8%IEA NZE15-4.5-7.4%IEEJ Advanced Tech.76-2.4-2.

188、2%IEEJ Reference146-0.1-0.1%15-0.4-1.9%1320.30.2%OPEC(2045)115-1.1-0.9%Resources for the Future33Table 12.Nuclear Consumption,by RegionWorldAvg.annual growthWestAvg.annual growthEastAvg.annual growthQBtuQBtuCAAGRQBtuQBtuCAAGRQBtuQBtuCAAGR19600001990210.7180.630.12020280.20.9%210.10.5%70.12.8%2021290

189、.21.0%210.10.5%80.13.0%2050202020502020205020202050 BNEF ETS340.20.7%BNEF NZS761.63.4%BP New Momentum350.20.8%13-0.3-1.6%220.53.9%BP Accelerated480.71.9%17-0.1-0.6%310.85.2%BP Net Zero581.02.5%210.00.1%361.05.7%Equinor Bridges450.61.6%Equinor Walls430.51.5%ExxonMobil440.520200.0-0.2%240.64.3%IEA STE

190、PS440.521210.00.0%230.54.1%IEA APS530.824240.10.4%290.74.9%IEA NZE601.12.6%IEEJ Advanced Tech.550.92.3%IEEJ Reference340.20.7%18-0.1-0.4%160.32.9%OPEC(2045)460.60.7%Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition34Table 13.Electricity Generation,by RegionCoalNatural gasHydroNucle

191、arOther renewablesOilTotal19904,4031,7522,1422,0131721,24211,86420209,4396,3334,3432,6733,25666426,708202110,2026,5514,3272,7763,79668228,3342050 BNEF ETS4,3343,514nd3,16335,3399746,447 BNEF NZS2,8452,799nd7,33567,789080,769 BP New Momentum6,6839,2566,0003,55024,30022750,015 BP Accelerated5073,3817,

192、5744,95040,577156,990 BP Net Zero4532,5338,0635,87344,486161,410 Equinor Bridges7621,3175,4334,24038,7503950,542 Equinor Walls4,9527,6255,7004,09422,49727345,143 ExxonMobil6,76711,1495,7134,33820,57524148,784 IEA STEPS5,9526,7306,8094,26025,78131249,845 IEA APS2,5943,9027,5435,10341,95217561,268 IEA

193、 NZE8275728,2515,81057,768373,231 IEEJ Advanced Tech.4,2549,5426,4645,30025,03720350,800 IEEJ Reference11,43413,6586,0103,31410,87149045,777Notes:Historical data from IEA.OPEC does not publish electricity data.BNEF groups hydro with other renewables.Equinor excludes electricity generation used in el

194、ectrolysis to produce hydrogen.Resources for the Future35Table 14.Global Renewable Electricity Generation,by SourceHydroBiomass/biogas/wasteWindSolarGeothermalOtherTotal19902,1421313.90.13602,31320204,3437091,59684694117,59820214,3277461,8701,01897648,1232050 BNEF ETSnd33216,69413,530nd4,78435,339 B

195、NEF NZSnd28639,05822,546nd5,89967,789 BP New Momentum6,0001,05411,34911,6781665230,300 BP Accelerated7,5741,56821,12217,20940427348,151 BP Net Zero8,0631,24423,37618,42749794352,550 Equinor Bridges5,4331,38315,90017,026nd4,44244,183 Equinor Walls5,7001,1929,15211,162nd99128,197 ExxonMobil5,713nd8,30

196、710,614nd1,65526,288 IEA STEPS6,8091,95110,69112,44745823432,590 IEA APS7,5433,17917,41619,92768674349,495 IEA NZE8,2513,28023,48628,5068571,63866,019 IEEJ Advanced Tech.6,464nd10,2909,8464824,41931,501 IEEJ Reference6,010nd4,7173,9043191,93116,881Notes:OPEC does not present electricity generation d

197、ata.BNEF includes hydro and geothermal in“other.”Equinor includes geothermal in“other.”ExxonMobil includes biomass and geothermal in“other.”IEEJ includes biomass in“other.”Global Energy Outlook 2023:Sowing the Seeds of an Energy Transition36Table 15.Net Carbon Dioxide Emissions,by RegionWorldAvg.ann

198、ual growthWestAvg.annual growthEastAvg.annual growthMMTMMTCAAGRMMTMMTCAAGRMMTMMTCAAGR199022.413.96.0202031.90.31.2%10.0-0.1-1.1%23.20.64.6%202133.70.41.3%ndndndndndnd2050202020502020205020202050 BNEF ETS24.6-0.2-0.9%BNEF NZS0.1-1.1-18%BP New Momentum25.2-0.2-1%BP Accelerated7.4-0.8-5%BP Net Zero1.2-

199、1.0-10.4%Equinor Bridges-0.8-1.1NA Equinor Walls22.3-0.3-1.2%ExxonMobil25.1-0.2-0.8%7.6-0.1-1%17.6-0.2-0.9%IEA STEPS28.9-0.1-0.3%IEA APS11.3-0.7-3%IEA NZE0.5-1.0-12.9%IEEJ Advanced Tech.16.9-0.5-2.1%IEEJ Reference37.00.20.5%10.20.00.1%24.70.00.2%OPEC(2045)34.00.10.2%Notes:Historical data from IEA.Ne

200、t CO2 emissions include positive(gross)and negative emissions from sources such as direct air capture and bioenergy with CCS.CO2 emissions data include fossil fuel combustion and exclude industrial process emissions.BP and IEA regional data are excluded because they include methane emissions(BP),fla

201、ring(BP),and industrial process emissions(BP and IEA).Resources for the Future376.Endnotes1.A.Grubler,Energy Transitions,in Encyclopedia of Earth(Environmental Information Coalition,National Council for Science and the Environment,2008).2.International Energy Agency,World Energy Balances Database(20

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